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NONCONSENSUAL BLOOD 
DRAWS AND DUAL LOYALTY: 
WHEN BODILY INTEGRITY 
CONFLICTS WITH THE PUBLIC 
HEALTH 
JACOB M. APPEL* 
Alcohol-impaired driving is among of the leading preventable causes of 
premature death in the United States and constitutes a grave public health concern.1  
In 2009, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) recorded 
10,839 fatalities involving drivers with blood alcohol levels above 0.08 g/dL.2  
NHTSA analysis placed the economic cost of drunk driving, as of 2000, at $114.4 
billion annually, including $71.6 billion paid by innocent third parties;3 in other 
words, by conservative estimates, alcohol-impaired driving costs society between 
sixteen and thirty cents for every mile driven under the influence.4  In order to 
combat alcohol-impaired driving, state and local governments have in recent years 
embraced a wide range of measures to apprehend offenders and remove them from 
the roads.  These include sobriety checkpoints,5 stiffer penalties such as mandatory 
jail time,6 breath alcohol ignition locks,7 and the use of portable breathalyzers and 
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 1. See, e.g., Christina Lindgren, Editorial, Drop The Scare Tactics: To Reduce Impaired 
Driving Fatalities, Treat Young People With Respect, BALT. SUN, Dec. 1, 2011, at 23A (reporting 
that in 2009, more than 10,000 people died as a result of impaired driving). 
 2. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., PUB. NO. DOT HS 811 385, TRAFFIC SAFETY 
FACTS: 2009 DATA 1 (2010), available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811385.PDF. 
 3. Impaired Driving in the United States, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., 
http://www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/alcohol/impaired_driving_pg2/US.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 
2013). 
 4. Steven D. Levitt & Jack Porter, How Dangerous Are Drinking Drivers?, 109 J. POL. 
ECON., 1198, 1201 (2001). 
 5. See Randy W. Elder et al., Effectiveness of Sobriety Checkpoints for Reducing Alcohol-
Involved Crashes, 3 TRAFFIC INJ. PREVENTION 266, 266 (2002) (noting that sobriety checkpoints 
have become popular law enforcement tools to curb drunk driving). 
 6. See Alexander C. Wagenaar et al., General Deterrence Effects of U.S. Statutory DUI Fine 
and Jail Penalties: Long-term Follow-up in 32 States, 39 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 
982, 982 (2007) (noting that eighteen states enacted statutes imposing mandatory jail sentences for 
first time DUI offenders from 1976 to 2002). 
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blood draws in the field to determine the blood alcohol content of drivers suspected 
of intoxication.8  Yet since their introduction by Lieutenant Robert Borkenstein of 
the Indiana State Police in the 1950s, breath-based assessments of intoxication have 
been frequently challenged in court on the grounds of accuracy, leading law 
enforcement to prefer direct blood sampling.9 
When suspects voluntarily agree to blood draws, this approach is not legally 
problematic.10  Increasingly, however, states are permitting law enforcement 
officers to draw blood forcibly from suspects and to seek the assistance of health 
care providers in the involuntary phlebotomy process.11  Nonconsensual blood 
draws from competent individuals raise a series of challenging ethical questions 
regarding both unwanted medical interventions and the role of health 
professionals:12  Do such blood draws violate fundamental human and 
Constitutional rights to bodily integrity?  Are physicians and other health care 
providers bound to participate in forced blood draws as part of their professional 
duty to serve the public welfare?  Or are these providers forbidden to participate as 
part of their professional obligation to respect patient autonomy and to do no harm?  
This article surveys current federal and state law on the subject and then explores 
the ethical and legal issues that are likely to confront physicians at this nexus of 
patient care and law enforcement.  
I. CURRENT LAW AND PRACTICE 
On August 14, 2004, Marc Martel, an emergency room physician at Hennepin 
County Medical Center in Minneapolis, Minnesota, was ordered by police to 
 
 7. See C. Willis et al., Alcohol Ignition Interlock Programmes for Reducing Drink Driving 
Recidivism, COCHRANE DATABASE SYSTEMATIC REV., Oct. 18, 2004, at 2 (noting that alcohol 
ignition interlocks are used in combating drinking and driving). 
 8. See Joseph T. Hallinan, Test Questions: In Fight to Stop Drunk Driving, Police Draw 
Blood, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2004, at A1 (noting that police routinely request breath tests of 
drivers suspected of drinking and driving and in many states also conduct forcible blood draws on 
suspects as well).  
 9. See, e.g., Jay Romano, Drunken Driving Statutes Criticized, N.Y. TIMES (Mar 11, 1990), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/03/11/nyregion/drunken-driving-statutes-
criticized.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (noting one challenge in the New Jersey Supreme Court 
to the legality of law enforcement using breathalyzers to obtain convictions for DUI offenses as 
well as discussing the potential for error in administering such tests).  
 10. See People v. Ward, 120 N.E.2d 211, 213 (1954) (noting that since the defendant 
voluntarily submitted to the test it was unnecessary to address the question whether a suspect must 
be given notice of his right to refuse to take a test to establish alcoholic content); Breithaupt v. 
Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 441 (1957) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (noting that a person who consents to 
a blood draws waives due process objections). 
 11. See Hallinan, supra note 8 (showing that laws in at least eight states allow police to draw 
blood by force and noting a common trend of police taking suspects who fail sobriety test to a 
medical facility to have their blood drawn).  
 12. Id. (noting that forcible blood draws on suspects raise questions on the amount of force 
that law enforcement may take in obtaining samples as well as the ethical dilemmas that medical 
professionals face in being forced to conduct blood draws on patients). 
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collect blood from a homicide suspect, Erik Lamont Lindsey, in order to determine 
his degree of intoxication.13  When Dr. Martel refused, expressing concerns about a 
hospital policy that prohibited performing “intrusive procedures” on unwilling 
patients, police had Hennepin County District Judge Diana Eagon phone the 
emergency room and order Dr. Martel to draw Lindsey’s blood.14  Minnesota state 
law permits such involuntary blood draws with a warrant, but does not address the 
question of whether health professionals can be commandeered for the phlebotomy 
process.15  Dr. Martel continued to refuse and was arrested for obstructing a 
homicide investigation.16  However, local prosecutors eventually declined to pursue 
charges against the physician.17  In another case, an emergency room resident 
physician at Martin Luther King Jr.-Drew Medical Center in Los Angeles, William 
Watkins, was handcuffed and detained in 1988 for refusing to draw blood from an 
unwilling hit-and-run suspect.18  A Compton police officer reportedly told the 
physician, “You draw the blood or go to jail,” although the hospital had earlier 
received clarification from the Deputy County Counsel stating that “if an arrestee 
expressly refuses to submit to testing, hospital personnel may not force the arrestee 
to submit to the testing.”19  In 2009, charge nurse Lisa Hofstra of Advocate Illinois 
Masonic Center sued the city of Chicago after a police officer handcuffed her for 
refusing to draw blood from a DWI suspect who had not yet been admitted to the 
hospital.20  While the arrest of medical providers for refusing nonconsensual blood 
draws remains a rare event, conflicts between clinicians and law enforcement will 
continue to arise in circumstances where either providers are uncertain of their legal 
duties or where their legal duties conflict with perceived ethical obligations to their 
patients.21  
 
 
 
 13. See Associated Press, Doctor Not Charged in Refusal to Draw Blood, Saint Paul Pioneer 
Press, Aug. 18, 2004, at B9 (describing the event that led to the arrest of Dr. Marc Martel). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Minnesota v. Shriner, 751 N.W.2d 538, 549–50 (Minn. 2008) (holding that Minnesota 
police officers may conduct a warrantless, forcible blood draw on a suspect arrested for drinking 
and driving as long as officers have probable cause to believe that a suspect committed criminal 
vehicular homicide or operation, but omitting whether medical professionals can be compelled to 
conduct such blood draws). 
 16. Associated Press, supra note 13. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Claire Spiegel & Patt Morrison, Doctor Held As He Balks at Taking Blood Of Suspect, 
L.A. TIMES, June 29, 1988, § 2 (Metro), at 3.  
 19. Id. 
 20. Frank Main, Nurse Arrested on the Job Sues Police, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 22, 2009, at 2. 
 21. See Hallinan, supra note 8 (noting that some doctors believe that performing blood draws 
on suspects without patient consent violates the Hippocratic Oath while other doctors feel 
reporting alcohol levels may violate the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 
which prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of patients’ records).  
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A.  Blood Draws Under Federal Law and the U. S. Constitution 
Federal law grants state and local jurisdictions significant latitude in 
developing policies on nonconsensual blood draws.22  In the modern era, the United 
States Supreme Court has generally adopted a restrictive view of forensic 
techniques that involve nonconsensual invasions of a criminal suspect’s body.23  A 
series of cases dating to the 1950s have addressed a wide assortment of law 
enforcement efforts to extract evidence from the body of an unwilling suspect.24  In 
the 1960s, most notably in Schmerber v. California, the Supreme Court attempted 
to articulate a clear doctrine in this area that established a balancing act between the 
nature of the incursion and the value of the evidence.25  During the ensuing five 
decades, a patchwork of decisions emanating from both the Supreme Court and the 
circuit courts has tended to favor strict limits upon such incursions, with 
involuntary blood draws being an exception to the general trend.26  
The seminal case in the field of involuntary invasions of bodily integrity is 
Rochin v. California.27  On July 1, 1949, responding to a tip that a man named 
Antonio Rochin was dealing in narcotics, the Los Angeles police entered Rochin’s 
home without a warrant, where they found the suspect seated upon his bed.28  On a 
night stand alongside the bed, “the deputies spied two capsules;” Rochin “seized 
the capsules and put them in his mouth.”29  During the ensuing struggle, three 
 
 22. See Michael A. Correll, Is There a Doctor in the (Station) House?: Reassessing the 
Constitutionality of Compelled DWI Blood Draws Forty-Five Years After Schmerber, 113 W. VA. 
L. REV., 381, 400–01 (2011) (noting that the Supreme Court’s “pro-search jurisprudence” on 
forcible blood draws has resulted in many states adopting a variety of statutory responses to limit 
their use by law enforcement). 
 23. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966) (finding in that case that a 
forcible blood draw performed on a DWI suspect was reasonable because it was performed by a 
physician under accepted medical standards). 
 24. See Michael G. Rogers, Bodily Intrusion in Search of Evidence: A Study in Fourth 
Amendment Decision-making, 62 IND. L.J.  1181, 1183–84 (1987) (discussing Rochin v. 
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), a case in which the Supreme Court overturned the defendant’s 
conviction on the ground that officers illegally obtained evidence by extracting contents from the 
defendant’s stomach); see also Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957); Schmerber, 384 U.S. 
757 (analyzing the constitutionality of blood draw under the fourth amendment of a conscious 
suspect). 
 25. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770–71 (establishing that an officer could reasonably believe 
that obtaining a warrant in order to draw a suspect’s blood could result in a delay that would 
destroy necessary evidence). 
 26. See Edward D. Tolley & N.E.H. Hull, Court Ordered Surgery to Retrieve Evidence in 
Georgia in Light of the United States Supreme Court Decision in Winston v. Lee, 37 MERCER L. 
REV. 1005, 1006, 1008–09 (1986) (discussing how many courts have held that any state ordered 
surgical procedure on a suspect is a per se intrusion, but that most courts tend to uphold simple, 
Schmerber-like procedures, such as taking blood samples from suspects). 
 27. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
 28. Id. at 166. 
 29. Id. 
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officers jumped upon the suspect in an effort to extract the capsules.30  When that 
effort failed, Rochin was handcuffed and transported to a local hospital.31  
According to Justice Frankfurter’s subsequent description of the facts: “At the 
direction of one of the officers, a doctor forced an emetic solution through a tube 
into Rochin’s stomach against his will.  This ‘stomach pumping’ produced 
vomiting.  In the vomited matter were found two capsules which proved to contain 
morphine.”32  As a result of this forced extraction, Rochin was convicted of a 
California state statute prohibiting the possession of morphine without a 
prescription.33  He challenged his conviction on the grounds that the extraction of 
evidence constituted an unreasonable search and/or seizure that violated the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment through its application of the Fourth 
Amendment to the states,34 leading to one of the strongest verdicts in favor of 
bodily integrity in the Court’s history to that time.35 
The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that forced stomach pumping to 
retrieve illegal drugs violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.36  Writing for the Court, Justice Felix Frankfurter noted that such 
conduct “shocked the conscience.”37  He quoted two dissenting judges from the 
California Supreme Court for the proposition that “a conviction which rests upon 
evidence of incriminating objects obtained from the body of the accused by 
physical abuse is as invalid as a conviction which rests upon a verbal confession 
extracted from him by such abuse.”38  In principle, Rochin seemed to open the door 
to a constitutional ban on the forcible extraction of blood.39  
In the wake of the Rochin ruling, it was only a matter of time before a 
criminal defendant challenged a forcible blood draw on Fourteenth Amendment 
grounds.  The Court managed to sidestep the larger issue of involuntary extractions 
in the 1957 case of Breithaupt v. Abram, ruling six to three in that blood drawn 
from an unconscious suspect after a traffic fatality was admissible as evidence.40  
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. (discussing the decision of a California Superior Court to convict Rochin of violating 
California law and sentence Rochin to sixty days in jail).  
 34. Brief for the Petitioner, Rochin, 342 U.S 165 (No. 83). 
 35. See Rogers, supra note 24, at 1184 (discussing Rochin as both a Fifth Amendment 
decision prohibiting the police from extracting evidence from a suspect’s body, as well as a Fourth 
Amendment decision denouncing certain police behavior).  
 36. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 174. 
 37. Id. at 172 (elaborating that the manner in which police officers obtained the evidence does  
“more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combating 
crime too energetically.”). 
 38. Id. at 167. 
 39. See Rogers, supra note 24, at 1184 (“Rochin draws a clear analogy between forcible 
extraction of evidence from the body and coerced confession.”). 
 40. 352 U.S. 432, 433–35, 440 (1957) 
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However, the Court left the determination of the constitutionality of forcible 
extractions from conscious defendants to a future case.41  Yet Breithaupt did lay the 
groundwork for extending the law enforcement prerogative to conscious but 
unwilling suspects.42  Justice Tom Clark, writing for the majority, noted the 
widespread use of blood testing in other areas of the law—from paternity testing to 
the use of ABO blood-typing in narrowing down suspect pools in criminal cases (in 
a manner that foreshadowed the later use of DNA evidence).43  Of note, Justices 
Warren, Black and Douglas dissented. 44  
The court finally confronted the issue of forcible blood draws from conscious 
suspects directly in Schmerber v. California (1966).45  Writing for the Court, 
Justice William Brennan noted that the seizure of elements of the human body was 
a subject that the federal courts had rarely dealt with in the past, and that therefore 
he was able to write upon “a clean slate.” 46  What resulted was an opinion that 
implicitly created a balancing test for such forcible incursions.47  Brennan noted 
that courts had previously upheld a wide swath of marginally intrusive 
interventions.48  According to these earlier rulings, the Constitution offers no 
protection against “compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or 
measurements, to write or speak for identification, . . . to assume a stance, to walk, 
or to make a particular gesture.”49  He also emphasized the significant value of 
blood draws to law enforcement authorities, observing that the “[e]xtraction of 
blood samples for testing is a highly effective means of determining the degree to 
which a person is under the influence of alcohol.”50  Finally, Brennan relied upon 
the widespread use of the practice at the time: “Such tests are a commonplace in 
these days of periodic physical examination, and experience with them teaches that 
the quantity of blood extracted is minimal, and that, for most people, the procedure 
involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain.”51  One authority on the case, Illinois 
attorney Jay Gitles, has observed that, “In Schmerber, the Court balanced the 
 
 41. See id. at 435 (noting that the case dealt with a blood draw of an unconscious driver). 
 42. Id. at 438 (noting that a blood draw under different conditions or on individuals deemed 
incompetent may be objectionable). 
 43. Id. at 436, 438 n.4.  
 44. Id. at 440 (stating that the facts in Rochin were comparable to Breithaupt and therefore the 
Court should find the same result).  
 45. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 758–59 (1966) (deciding whether the 
petitioner was denied due process when the arresting officer directed a physician to obtain a blood 
sample despite the petitioner’s refusal). 
 46. Id. at 767–68.  
 47. See Jay A. Gitles, Fourth Amendment – Reasonableness Of Surgical Intrusions, 76 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 972, 972 (1985) (noting that the Schmerber Court adopted a balancing 
test that weighs a defendant’s right of personal privacy and bodily integrity against the state’s 
interest in collecting evidence in determining the reasonableness of police conduct). 
 48. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 763–64. 
 49. Id. at 764.  
 50. Id. at 771.  
 51. Id.  
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procedure’s threat to the suspect’s safety and health and the intrusiveness upon the 
suspect’s dignitary interest in personal privacy and bodily integrity against the 
community’s evidentiary interest in more fairly and accurately determining guilt or 
innocence.”52 
Brennan’s ruling only applied to blood draws by medical personnel.53  He 
declined to address the question of whether such blood draws would pass 
constitutional muster if the police themselves drew blood at the stationhouse, nor 
did he confront the question of whether medical professionals could be required to 
extract blood.54  Yet as a result of Schmerber v. California, the practice of 
warrantless blood draws after DWI stops became policy in many jurisdictions.55  
Several decisions in the post-Schmerber era do suggest a window for 
narrowing the powers on law enforcement in the future.  Notably, in Winston v. 
Lee, Virginia prosecutors sought court-ordered surgery to remove a bullet from the 
chest of a robbery suspect, Rudolf Lee, who had allegedly been wounded at the 
crime scene.56  The state hoped to use ballistic evidence to connect the defendant 
directly to the victim’s gun.57  After a federal district court enjoined a state court 
judge’s order for the surgery, the Supreme Court intervened.58  Justice Brennan 
wrote for the Court once again and flushed out the balancing test he had hinted at in 
Schmerber.59  According to Brennan, “the reasonableness of surgical intrusions 
beneath the skin depends on a case-by-case approach, in which the individual’s 
interests in privacy and security are weighed against society’s interests in 
conducting the procedure.”60  Ultimately, the Court decided that the surgery sought 
by Virginia prosecutors did not pass the balancing test.61  Brennan observed that 
“the intrusion on respondent’s privacy interests and bodily integrity can only be 
characterized as severe.  Surgery without the patient’s consent, performed under a 
general anesthetic to search for evidence of a crime, involves a virtually total 
 
 52. See Gitles, supra note 47, at 979.  
 53. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771–72 (limiting the Court’s ruling to the validity of blood 
draws conducted by medical professionals and noting that blood draws performed by non-medical 
professionals or in non-medical environments present different concerns on suspects’ rights). 
 54. Id. at 772.  
 55. See Carleton v. Superior Court, 170 Cal. App. 3d 1182, 1185 (Ct. App. 1985) (finding that 
a warrant is not needed for a blood draw following a felony drunk driving arrest); see also Ellis v. 
Cotton, 2008 WL 4182359, at *6–9 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2008) (finding the case to be “remarkably 
similar to Schmerber,” and finding that the police officer’s forcible extraction of blood did not 
violate the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights). 
 56. 470 U.S. 753, 756 (1985). 
 57. Id. at 755.  
 58. Id. at 757–58.  Following the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia’s decision 
to enjoin the surgery, the Fourth Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
determine whether the state could force a suspect to undergo surgery in their efforts to gather 
evidence for a crime.  Id.  
 59. Id. at 763; see also supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 60. Winston, 470 U.S. at 760.  
 61. Id. at 766. 
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divestment of the patient’s ordinary control over surgical probing beneath his 
skin.”62  He also took note of the “uncertainty about the medical risks” involving in 
such a procedure, which he saw as a factor distinguishing it from the earlier blood 
draw cases.63  In the decades since Winston, lower courts have been divided in their 
verdicts when applying the balancing test to forced surgeries.64 
In Schmerber, Brennan held out the possibility that the Constitution might 
require an exception for those suspects who objected to blood draws out of 
“concern for health, or religious scruple.”65  In theory, particularly after the limits 
outlined in Winston, an individual defendant might be able to establish that the 
unique aspects of his circumstances render an involuntary blood draw upon his 
person more like the intrusion in Winston than that in Schmerber.66  To date, 
however, no defendant has successfully done so.  As a result, the most significant 
impact of the Schmerber decision was to establish a legal floor that enabled state 
and local authorities to generate their own guidelines for forcible blood draws.67  
Needless to say, the results vary strikingly by jurisdiction, often shaped by state 
constitutional requirement that may prove more stringent than those mandated by 
the federal courts.68 
In 2013, the Supreme Court revisited the issue warrantless blood draws in 
Missouri v. McNeely.69  The case arose after Missouri police stopped driver Tyler 
G. McNeely for allegedly speeding and crossing the yellow line.70  McNeely 
refused both a breath analysis and a blood test to measure his blood alcohol content 
 
 62. Id. at 754. 
 63. Id. at 764 (noting the uncertainty in the nature of the surgery in that one surgeon believed 
that it would take approximately fifteen to twenty minutes while another surgeon predicted that it 
could last up to two and half hours). 
 64. See Gitles, supra note 47, at 979–80 (noting that, unlike the Winston Court, several lower 
courts have permitted court-ordered surgery to gather evidence for criminal prosecutions).  
 65. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 n.9, 771 (1966). 
 66. See Winston, 470 U.S. at 766 (finding in that case that the substantial intrusion of a 
protected interest, the medical risks involved, and the intrusion on the suspect’s privacy that 
would be caused by surgery, did not outweigh the state’s interest in gathering evidence).  
 67. See Correll, supra note 22, at 395, 401 (noting that states have generally responded to 
Schmerber in one of four ways: allowing law enforcement to conduct forcible non-consensual 
blood draws, adopting a right to refuse policy for drivers, permitting blood draws in severe 
circumstances, or allowing police to notify suspects that force will be used unless they voluntarily 
submit a blood sample).  
 68. See Willard Bergman, Jr., Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol: A Model Implied 
Consent Statute, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV 654, 656 (1971) (noting that states used their police 
powers to pass varying implied consent statutes authorizing chemical test to determine alcoholic 
content over a concern of a growing drunk driving problem); see also Correll, supra note 22, at 
401–02 (noting that states addressed differently the Schmerber use of force test by statute for 
example Florida permits blood draws by a specified group of medical professionals, while 
Maryland permits blood draws by a “qualified medical person” without enumerating specific 
professions). 
 69. 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1556 (2013). 
 70. Id. 
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(BAC).71  Relying on the “exigent circumstances” justification of Schmerber,72 the 
police transported McNeely to a local hospital and had a lab technician draw his 
blood without his consent.73  Both the trial court and the Missouri State Supreme 
Court ruled the result of the test inadmissible as violations of the Fourth 
Amendment, arguing that routine DWI stops did not qualify as emergencies, and 
the state appealed.74  A fragmented United States Supreme Court, per Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor, upheld the Missouri Supreme Court’s conclusion.75  
Sotomayor did not reject Schmerber.76  Rather, she analyzed the facts of 
McNeely in the context of Schmerber, ultimately rejecting the State of Missouri’s 
claim that such blood draws in DWI cases were per se admissible evidence 
because, as the state viewed the matter, the dissipation of alcohol from the blood 
stream inherently posed an “exigent circumstance.”77  Instead, Justice Sotomayor’s 
majority opinion, evaluating the need for warrantless action under a “totality of 
circumstances” standard,78 found that routine DWI stops did not qualify as exigent 
events.79  According to Sotomayor: “The context of blood testing is different in 
critical respects from other destruction-of-evidence cases in which the police are 
truly confronted with a ‘now or never’ situation . . . because BAC evidence from a 
drunk-driving suspect naturally dissipates over time in a gradual and relatively 
predictable manner.”80  However, Sotomayor allowed that under certain 
circumstances, a particular case might trigger an exigent circumstances exception.81  
What proved most striking about Sotomayor’s opinion was a second justification 
she offered for requiring warrants in routing stops, namely that “because a police 
officer must typically transport a drunk-driving suspect to a medical facility and 
obtain the assistance of someone with appropriate medical training before 
conducting a blood test, some delay between the time of the arrest or accident and 
the time of the test is inevitable regardless of whether police officers are required to 
 
 71. Id. at 1556–57. 
 72. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770–71 (1966) (discussing the circumstances 
of the case and concluding that such circumstances justified the officer’s choice to secure the 
evidence absent a warrant). 
 73. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1557. 
 74. Id. (discussing the trial court and the Missouri Supreme Court’s findings). 
 75. Id. at 1556. 
 76. See id. at 1563 (noting that the basis for the finding in Schmerber, the dissipation of 
alcohol in the blood, may support a finding of exigency in some cases, but it is not a categorical 
exception). 
 77. Id. at 1561, 1563. 
 78. Id. at 1563. 
 79. See id. at 1568 (describing the relevant factors for a “routine DWI” to qualify as an 
exigent event). 
 80. Id. at 1561. 
 81. See id. at 1568 (finding that some cases will still arise where a warrantless blood test will 
be justified). 
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obtain a warrant.”82  Yet in some states, where law enforcement officers are trained 
to draw blood in the field, such transportation no longer proves necessary.83 
B.  Blood Draws Under State Laws 
New York enacted an “implied consent” statute in 1953, which deemed that 
the act of driving itself indicated that a driver had consented to chemical testing for 
intoxication.84  All forty-nine other states and the District of Columbia have since 
adopted similar statutes.85  However, in some jurisdictions, authorities will attempt 
to obtain a suspect’s blood by force, while in others, the driver will simply face a 
penalty for refusal, such as automatic forfeiture of a driver’s license and/or a stiff 
fine.86  States also differ on whether a bench warrant is required—although states 
that now permit warrantless draws will presumably narrow or eliminate such 
exception in light of McNeely87—and upon whether the blood may be drawn by the 
police themselves or whether medical personnel must conduct the extraction.88  In 
1995, Arizona became the first state to authorize law enforcement officers to draw 
blood on their own.89  The Phoenix Police Department now has one hundred twenty 
officers trained in the practice and conducts up to five hundred tests per month.90  
Some police departments in Idaho,91 Texas92 and Utah93 also have officers who are 
authorized to conduct on-site phlebotomy. 
Table I below describes the various nuances of state statutes regarding blood 
draws for law-enforcement purposes.  It is also worth noting that at least two states, 
 
 82. Id. at 1561. 
 83. See The Dangers of Phleboto-Cops: Why We All Should Be Frightened About Police 
“Phlebotomists”, KATHLEEN N. CAREY LAW OFFICES, PLC, http://www.azduiatty.com/the-
dangers-of-phleboto-cops.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) (discussing the increase in officers 
taking blood samples from DUI suspects in the field). 
 84. NY VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 71-a (1953).  
 85. See Hallinan, supra note 8. 
 86. See AMY BERNING ET AL., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., RES. NOTE NO. 
810871, TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS: BREATH TEST REFUSALS 1, 6 (2007), available at 
http://ntl.bts.gov/lib/30000/30100/30142/810871.pdf.  
 87. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1568. 
 88. See Correll, supra note 22, at 401–02 (noting that, while New York requires an arresting 
officer to obtain a bench warrant or court order, California only allows certified technicians to 
conduct blood draws under specific circumstances). 
 89. See Officers’ New Tool Against D.W.I.: Syringe, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2009, at A11.  
 90. Id. (discussing the use of blood draws by the Phoenix Police Department as well as other 
police departments around the country). 
 91. Rebecca Boone, DWI Project Drawing Blood, FORT WAYNE J. GAZETTE, Sept. 14 2009, 
at 8A. 
 92. See id. (noting that a select group of Texas officers have received training to complete 
blood draws on suspected drunken drivers). 
 93. See BERNING ET AL., supra note 86, at 6 (noting that as of 2006, there were fifty-three 
police officers in Utah trained to perform blood draws and that the state planned to train more).  
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Hawaii94 and Idaho,95 have statutes that overtly compel health care providers to 
perform blood draws when instructed to do so by law enforcement.  In contrast, 
South Dakota law explicitly guarantees medical providers the right to refuse such a 
request.96  The impact of McNeely is unclear, as states may either impose a warrant 
requirement university or might choose to delineate narrower, exigent 
circumstances under which a warrant would not be required.97 
TABLE 1: STATE LAWS REGARDING BLOOD DRAWS  
FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES 
State Authorizes 
Force 
Warrant 
Required? 
Who May 
Perform 
Additional 
Restrictions 
AL98 NO NO (for 
unconscious 
drivers) 
No restrictions (for 
unconscious 
drivers) 
Consent to draw 
blood on 
unconscious 
driver is presumed 
AK99 YES NO No restrictions Only applies 
when a preceding 
motor vehicle 
incident has 
resulted in  
“physical injury to 
another person.” 
AR100 NO Not 
applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable 
 
 94. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 291E (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2011).  
 95. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8002–03 (2004 & Supp. 2012); see also Idaho v. Diaz, 160 P.3d 
739, 743 (Idaho 2007) (“A plain reading of Idaho Code § 18-8002(6) shows that an officer may 
always request hospital personnel to draw a suspect’s blood upon suspicion for DUI but may only 
compel a blood draw under certain circumstances.”).  
 96. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 32-23-14 (2011). 
 97. See Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1568 (2013) (discussing the relevant factors in 
determining whether exigent circumstances existed, justifying a warrantless search, but clarifying 
that a broad interpretation to include all DWI cases is insufficient for a warrantless seizure of 
blood evidence). 
 98. ALA. CODE §§ 32-5-192, 32-5A-194(a)(2), 32-5-200 (LexisNexis 2010). 
 99. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.035 (2010).  But see Bass v. Mun. of Anchorage, 692 P.2d. 961, 
965 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984) (noting that the section should be read narrowly because the 
legislature did not want to give police the power to forcibly take blood tests). 
 100. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1321(D) (Supp. 2011) (noting that a test shall not be given if 
refused unless pursuant to a search warrant); see also Carrillo v. Houser, 232 P.3d 1245, 1245 
(Ariz. 2010) (holding that Arizona’s implied consent statute typically forbids police from giving a 
test in the absence of a warrant unless the arrestee agrees to it); U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, 
REFUSAL OF INTOXICATION TESTING: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 12 (2008) available at 
http://www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/Traffic%20Injury%20Control/Articles/Associated%20Files/8
11098.pdf.  
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AZ101 YES YES Medical personnel 
only, unless driver 
consent 
 
CA102 YES NO No Restrictions Unless officer 
suspects other 
intoxicants, driver 
may consent to 
breath test instead 
CO103 YES NO Medical personnel 
only 
Limited to cases 
of negligent 
vehicular 
homicide 
CT104 UNCLEAR NO Medical personnel 
only 
Section 227b of 
statute requires 
driver consent; 
however, section 
227c seems to 
permit draws in 
absence of 
consent for 
probable causes if 
serious injury or 
death has 
occurred.  Author 
could find no 
causes in which 
force was actually 
use 
DE105 YES NO Medical personnel 
only 
 
FL106 YES NO No restrictions Only applies 
when a preceding 
motor vehicle 
incident has 
resulted in  
 
 101. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-205(a)(1) (Supp. 2011). 
 102. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23612 (West Supp. 2012).  
 103. COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1301.1(3) (West 2012) (noting that physical force is allowed 
only when a law enforcement officer “has probable cause to believe that the person has committed 
criminally negligent homicide”).    
 104. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-227b, 227c (West Supp. 2012). 
 105. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, §§ 2740, 2741, 2746 (2005).  
  
2014] NONCONSENSUAL BLOOD DRAWS AND DUAL LOYALTY 141 
“serious bodily 
injury.” 
GA107 NO Not 
applicable 
Not applicable  
HI108 YES NO Medical personnel 
only 
Possible breath 
test option in 
cases where no 
injury occurs 
ID109 YES NO Medical personnel 
or officers with 
specialized 
training. 
 
IL110 YES NO Medical personnel 
only 
Only applies in 
cases of death or 
injury 
IN111 YES NO Medical personnel 
only 
 
IA112 YES YES Medical personnel 
only 
Only applies in 
cases of death or 
injury likely to 
cause death 
KS113 YES YES No restrictions Applies when 
driver “was 
operating or 
attempting to 
operate a vehicle 
and such vehicle 
has been involved 
in an accident or 
collision resulting 
in serious injury 
or death of a 
 
 106. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.1933 (West 2006). 
 107. GA. CODE ANN. § 40-5-67.1(d) (2011). 
 108. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 291E-12, 21 (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2011). 
 109. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-8002, -8003 (Supp. 2012); see also State v. Diaz, 160 P.3d 739, 
741 (Idaho 2007) (discussing the Idaho Code and how implied consent allows for “testing a 
suspect’s blood”). 
 110. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-501.2 (West 2008); See also Yanchin v. Libertyville, 803 
F. Supp. 2d 844, 853 (N.D. Ill. 2011). 
 111. IND. CODE ANN. § 9-30-6-6 (LexisNexis 2010). 
 112. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 321J.10A–11 (West 2005 & Supp. 2012). 
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person and the 
operator could be 
cited for any 
traffic offense 
KY114 YES YES Medical personnel 
only 
Applies when a 
person is killed or 
suffers serious 
injury 
LA115 YES NO No restrictions Two prior 
incidents of 
refusal required 
ME116 YES NO Driver may request 
medical personnel, 
if available 
Only applies if 
officer believes 
“death has 
occurred or will 
occur as a result 
of an accident.” 
MD
117
 
YES NO Medical personnel 
only 
Only applies in 
cases of death or 
life threatening 
injury 
MA
118
 
NO Not 
applicable 
Not applicable  
MI119 YES YES Medical personnel 
only 
 
MN
120
 
YES NO Medical personnel 
only 
Only applies in 
cases of death, 
injury, or property 
damage 
 
 113. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1001 (2001).  
 114. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189A.105(2)(b) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011). 
 115. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §14:98.2 (2012); see also State v. Dayton, 445 So.2d 76 (La. Ct. 
App. 1984) (including “chemical blood analysis” in a discussion of “chemical tests,” which is the 
term used in the relevant statute).  
 116. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, §§ 2521, 2522, 2524 (1996 & Supp. 2011). 
 117. MD. CODE ANN. TRANSP. § 16-205.1 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011). 
 118. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24 (West Supp. 2012). 
 119. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.625a(6)(b), .625d (West Supp. 2012); see also AMY 
BERNING ET AL., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., REP. NO. DOT HS 811098, 
REFUSAL OF INTOXICATION TESTING: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 13 (2008) (noting that in most 
Michigan counties prosecutors have adopted policies requiring police officers to receive warrants 
before submitting drivers to a blood test).  
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MS121 NO Not 
applicable 
Not applicable  
MO
122
 
YES YES—but 
struck down 
in Missouri v. 
McNeely 
(2013)123 
Medical personnel 
only 
 
MT124 YES YES No restrictions Only in cases with 
prior conviction 
for DWI related 
offense 
NE125 NO Not 
applicable 
Not applicable  
NV126 YES NO No restrictions Only applies if the 
officer has 
“reasonable 
grounds to 
believe” that the 
driver caused 
death or serious 
harm to another 
while driving 
drunk or has been 
convicted within 
the previous seven 
years of a similar 
violation 
NH127 YES NO Medical personnel 
only 
Only applies in 
cases of death or 
 
 120. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169A.51 (West Supp. 2012); see also Minnesota v. Shriner, 751 
N.W.2d 538, 549 (Minn. 2008); supra note 15 and accompanying text.  
 121. MISS. CODE ANN § 63-11-30 (2004 & Supp. 2011). 
 122. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 577.029, .041 (West 2011); see also State v. Smith, 134 S.W.3d 35, 40 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that law enforcement officers can proceed with a blood draw after a 
defendant has refused as long as officers obtain a warrant).  
 123. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1568 (2013) (holding that the natural dissipation 
of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case involving a drunk-
driving investigation). 
 124. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-402 (2011). 
 125. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 60-6, 197, 197.03 (Supp. 2011). 
 126. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484C.160 (2010); see also BERNING ET AL., supra note 119, at 
15 (noting that Nevada’s law does not require police officers to obtain a warrant before 
conducting forcible blood draws on drivers who refuse to take a breath test).  
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serious injury 
NJ128 UNCLEAR NO Medical personnel 
only 
Despite seemingly 
clear state statute 
prohibiting 
involuntary blood 
draws, some state 
courts have 
upheld such draws 
on implied 
consent grounds 
NM
129
 
YES YES Medical personnel 
only 
 
NY130 YES YES No restrictions Only applies in 
cases of death or 
serious injury 
NC131 YES NO “[A] physician, 
registered nurse, 
emergency medical 
technician, or other 
qualified person.” 
 
ND132 NO Not 
applicable 
NA  
OH133 YES NO “Only a physician, 
a registered nurse, 
an emergency 
medical technician-
intermediate, an 
emergency medical 
technician-
paramedic, or a 
 
 
 127. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 265-A:5, A:16 (LexisNexis 2011). 
 128. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.2(e) (West Supp. 2012) (stating the forcible taking of chemical 
tests is not permitted); see also State v. Ravotto, 777 A.2d 301, 305 (N.J. 2001) (ruling that 
implied consent exists “when the test is itself [is] not performed forcibly or against physical 
resistance”).  
 129. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-8-103, 111 (LexisNexis 2009). 
 130. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194 (McKinney 2011). 
 131. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-16.2, -139.1 (2011); see also State v. Fletcher, 688 S.E.2d 
94, 98 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that North Carolina law allows police officers to obtain forced 
blood tests without a search warrant as long as an officer has “probable cause” and a “reasonable 
belief that a delay in testing would result in dissipation of the person’s blood alcohol content”). 
 132. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01 (Supp. 2011).  
 133. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2012).  
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qualified 
technician, 
chemist, or 
phlebotomist shall 
withdraw a blood 
sample for the 
purpose of 
determining the 
alcohol, drug, 
controlled 
substance, 
metabolite of a 
controlled 
substance, or 
combination 
content of the 
whole blood, blood 
serum, or blood 
plasma.” 
OK134 NO Not 
applicable 
Not applicable  
OR135 YES Varies by 
county 
Medical personnel 
only 
 
PA136 NO Not 
applicable 
Not applicable  
RI 137 NO Not 
applicable 
Not applicable  
SC138 NO Not 
applicable 
Not applicable  
SD139 NO Not 
applicable 
Not applicable Also creates 
complete shield 
for physicians: 
“No person 
 
 134. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 11-902 (West 2007 & Supp. 2012). 
 135. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 813.100, .160(2) (2011); see also BERNING ET AL., supra note 119, at 
14 (“The use of warrants for blood samples in Oregon began more recently and is in effect in a 
few counties.  There is not a specific law that allows for forced blood draws, but Oregon’s 
impaired driving law has been interpreted to allow for warrants and blood draws. The officer must 
first inform the suspect of the consequences of refusing or failing the test.”). 
 136. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547(b) (West Supp. 2012). 
 137. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-2.1(b) (Supp. 2011). 
 138. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-6-2951(A) (Supp. 2011). 
 139. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 32-23-14 (2011). 
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authorized to 
withdraw blood 
under this section 
may be required 
or forced to 
withdraw blood 
for the purposes 
outlined in this 
chapter, unless 
required pursuant 
to a written 
agreement.” 
TN140 YES NO Medical personnel 
only 
Only applies if 
accident causes 
serious injury or 
death, if driver 
has two prior 
convictions, or if 
children are in 
vehicle 
TX141 YES NO No restrictions “[A]llows for 
blood draws to be 
conducted when a 
preceding motor 
vehicle incident 
has resulted in 
death or serious 
injury or has been 
convicted of 
certain crimes in 
the past.” 
 
UT142 YES NO No restrictions  
 
 140. TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-10-406 (2008 & Supp. 2011). 
 141. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 724.012(b) (West 2011 & Supp. 2010); see also Beeman v. 
State, 86 S.W.3d. 613, 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (explaining that “the implied consent statute 
requires the State to take an arrested suspect’s blood, over his refusal, when there is an accident 
and someone is injured”). 
 142. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-520 (LexisNexis 2010); see also BERNING ET AL., supra note 
119, at 14 (noting that since 2006 Utah has required police officers to obtain warrants for blood 
draws for breath test refusals and that the state’s procedure is based not on a statute but on “case 
law whereby a police officer swears an affidavit before a justice and can be granted a warrant to 
obtain a blood sample”). 
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VT143 YES YES Medical personnel 
only 
Only in cases of 
serious injury or 
death 
VA144 YES NO No restrictions  
WA
145
 
YES YES No restrictions  
WV
146
 
NO Not 
applicable 
Not applicable  
WI147 YES NO doctor, nurse, 
medical 
technologist, 
physician assistant 
or person acting 
under the direction 
of a physician 
 
WY
148
 
YES YES (unless 
serious death 
or injury 
occur) 
Trained officers or 
medical personnel 
Warrantless draws 
permitted in cases 
of serious death or 
injury 
 
While state laws differ considerably, the overall trend in recent years has been 
toward the expansion of forcible testing.149  “No refusal” weekends have become 
frequent occurrences in Texas, where 212 communities—including Houston, 
Austin and Fort Worth—participate.150  These blanket compulsory testing periods 
 
 143. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 1202(f), 1203(b) (2007 & Supp. 2011). 
 144. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-268.2 (2009). 
 145. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.20.308(3) (West 2013); see also Seattle v. St. John 215 
P.3d 194, 197 (Wash. 2009) (discussing how, despite Washington’s implied consent statute, an 
officer may obtain a blood alcohol test if they obtain a warrant).  
 146. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17C-5-7 (LexisNexis 2009). 
 147. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 343.305 (West 2010); see also State v. Krajewski, 648 N.W.2d 385, 
398–99 (Wis. 2002) (reasoning that the “rapid dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream creates an 
exigency that justifies a nonconsensual test of the blood” for persons arrested for drunk driving as 
long as the test is administered pursuant to certain factors).  
 148. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-6-102(d), -105(b) (2011). 
 149. See Hallinan, supra note 8 (noting that at least eight states have enacted statutes 
permitting police officers to use reasonable force to obtain blood samples from drivers in DUI 
cases).  
150See Allison Harris, Austin Police, Various Agencies to Enforce No-Refusal Weekend, DAILY 
TEXAN (July 4, 2011), http://www.dailytexanonline.com/news/2011/07/04/austin-police-various-
agencies-enforce-no-refusal-weekend (discussing the number of law enforcement agencies in 
Texas that have adopted a “no refusal” weekend policy to reduce drinking and driving); Stephanie 
Lucero, North Texas No Refusal Weekend Starts Friday Night, CBS (Dec. 28, 2012), 
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have spread to localities in at least seven other states,151 among which are the cities 
of Columbus, Ohio,152 and Jefferson Parish, Louisiana.153  Eight states have 
adopted or expanded forcible blood draws in the last ten years, while other states, 
such as Colorado, have seriously considered legislation.154  Increasingly, these laws 
create ethical and legal challenges for hospitals and clinicians.155  Not the least of 
these dilemmas is the difficulty of determining the accurate rule in a particular 
jurisdiction, as police departments and prosecutors have often engaged in 
aggressive interpretations of state laws to conduct nonconsensual tests in states, 
such as Illinois, where a plain reading of the statute would have led a reasonable 
person to conclude that such tests were prohibited.156  While the state policies 
outlined above offer a considered assessment of current law, the complexity of the 
statutes and potential for aggressive interpretation raise the possibility that 
physicians in nearly any jurisdiction might be asked to conduct forcible 
phlebotomy. 
 
http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2012/12/28/north-texas-no-refusal-weekend-starts-friday-night/ (reporting 
deputies will patrol for suspected drunk driving during the New Years holiday); Brian Rogers, 
Prosecutors Tout Success of No-Refusal Weekend, HOUSTON CHRON. (Jan. 3, 2012), 
http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Prosecutors-tout-success-of-no-refusal-
weekend-2439541.php (reporting the No Refusal program had been in effect in Harris County and 
Montgomery County nearly every weekend in 2011). 
 151. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., No-Refusal Initiative Facts, 
http://www.nhtsa.gov/no-refusal/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2013) (reporting that numerous states 
including Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Texas, and Utah have 
implemented No Refusal initiatives). 
 152. See Kathy L. Gray, Holiday DUI Suspects Risk Forced Blood Test; Court’s OK Likely if 
Breath Exam Is Refused, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 3, 2008, at 3B (discussing how Columbus 
police instituted a “no-refusal weekend” during which drivers refusing to take breath tests were 
compelled to take blood tests). 
 153. See Melinda Morris, DWI Suspects Will Face Forced Blood Tests Judges Will be Ready 
on Holiday Weekend, NEWSROOM, May 13, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 9860143 (discussing 
how the Jefferson Parish district attorney’s office arranged for judges to be available over 
Memorial Day weekend to sign search warrants giving officers the authority to conduct blood 
tests on DWI suspects).  
 154. See Hallinan, supra note 8 (reporting that Alaska, Arizona, Iowa, Florida, Indiana, 
Michigan, Nevada, and Texas all recently passed statutes permitting police to use reasonable force 
to obtain blood samples); see also Rebecca Boyle, Under Bill, Drunk Drivers Would Have to Take 
Alcohol Test, GREELEY TRIB. (Mar. 22, 2007), 
http://www.greeleytribune.com/article/20070322/NEWS/103210101 (reporting a proposed bill in 
Colorado where suspected drunk drivers, who are given the option of a breathalyzer or blood test, 
will be required to take a test even if the requested option is not available).  
 155. See, e.g., E. John Wherry, Jr., DWI Blood Alcohol Testing: Responding to a Proposal 
Compelling Medical Personnel to Withdraw Blood, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 655, 657, 670–71 
(1994) (commenting that laws requiring medical personnel to draw blood for law enforcement 
purposes violate physician-patient privilege as well as a health provider’s ethical duty to care for 
the health of patients).  
 156. See People v. Farris, 968 N.E.2d 191, 197 (Ill. Ct. App. 2012) (interpreting Illinois’s 
statute to prohibit law enforcement officials from using force to obtain a blood sample of a DWI 
suspect).  
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II.  ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The dominant approach to western medical ethics since the 1970s is one that 
favors patient autonomy and privileges the right of the competent patient to make 
his own medical decisions.157  Among the most fundamental aspects of this right is 
the authority to turn down unwanted medical interventions.158  Western medical 
ethicists and courts have largely reached a consensus that an adult with capacity 
may reject even life saving measures—guaranteeing, for example, Jehovah’s 
Witnesses the right to refuse blood transfusions and Christian Scientists the right to 
refuse antibiotics.159  Physicians who forcibly provide such care over a patient’s 
objections will risk civil liability and may be guilty of battery.160  At the same time, 
government and professional authorities have long accepted that medical providers, 
as licensees of the state and possessors of a state-sanctioned monopoly in the 
healing arts, have dual loyalties: in addition to having an ethical duty to individual 
patients, providers also have an ethical obligation to serve the public at large that 
may trump the duty to patients under limited circumstances.161  As a result, 
physicians may be compelled to report a wide variety of public health hazards, 
ranging from communicable diseases to gunshot wounds.162  Physicians may also 
be compelled to violate doctor-patient confidentiality in instances of suspected 
 
 157. See Cathy J. Jones, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Medical Decisionmaking: Toward 
a New Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 379, 391–97 (1990) (describing the 
evolution of the patient’s right to informed consent and to self-determination).   
 158. See, e.g., George J. Annas & Joan E. Densberger, Competence to Refuse Medical 
Treatment: Autonomy vs. Paternalism, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 561, 565–69 (1984) (describing the 
right of competent adults to refuse medical treatment). 
 159. See generally Sarah Woolley, Jehovah’s Witnesses in the Emergency Department: What 
Are Their Rights?, 22 EMERGENCY MED. J. 869, 870 (2005) (explaining that the law 
unequivocally protects the Jehovah’s Witness patient’s right to refuse medical treatment, even 
when physicians believe the reasons are irrational and the patient will die in the absence of 
treatment); Larry May, Challenging Medical Authority: The Refusal of Treatment by Christian 
Scientists, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.–Feb. 1995, at 15, 15–17 (explaining that Christian 
Scientists refuse all medical treatment and turn to prayer to battle health issues). 
 160. See, e.g., Malette v. Shulman, [1990] O.R. 2d. 417 (Can. Ont.) (holding a physician liable 
for negligence, assault, and battery for performing a blood transfusion on a Jehovah’s Witness 
patient who carried a card in her wallet identifying her as a Jehovah’s Witness and requesting that 
no blood transfusion be given to her); Schloendorff v. Soc’y of the N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93–
94 (N.Y. 1914) (noting that a surgeon who operates on a patient without the patient’s consent 
commits an assault).  
 161. See Christopher J. Lockey & Phillip Resnick, Physicians’ Duty to Prevent Harm to 
Nonpatients, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 580, 581 (2008). 
 162. See Jeffrey T. Berger et al., Reporting by Physicians of Impaired Drivers and Potentially 
Impaired Drivers, 15 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 667, 669 (2000) (explaining that compulsory 
reporting of conditions that impact public safety is an exception to patient-physician 
confidentiality); see generally MD. CODE REGS. 10.06.01.03 (2011) (requiring health care 
providers to report certain diseases and conditions); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-703 
(LexisNexis 2009) (requiring health care practitioners to report gunshot injuries). 
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child abuse, future violent crimes or the impaired practice of medicine.163  In fact, 
some jurisdictions even require physicians to report impaired driving to state 
authorities.164  Forcible blood draws of suspected drunk drivers place the duty to 
patient autonomy and the duty to protect the public in direct conflict.165 
Blood draws are not entirely benign interventions.166  While for the vast 
majority of suspects, the only side effect of the procedure is minor pain and 
bruising, a small subset of individuals may suffer more significant detriment.167  
Some individuals have compelling medical reasons for refusing blood draws, such 
as hemophilia or ongoing anticoagulant therapy.168  Others may have religious 
objections to removing blood, especially when the blood draw is not intended to 
serve a life-saving or other medical purpose169  Some state statutes do shield these 
minorities, but providers and law enforcement will likely face considerable 
 
 163. See Frank T. Saulsbury & Robert E. Campbell, Evaluation of Child Abuse Reporting by 
Physicians, 139 AM. J. DISEASES CHILDREN 393, 394 (1985) (reporting that in one study 
surveying physicians the majority of physicians claimed to report almost all sexual abuse cases to 
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challenges in determining who qualifies.170  Once these exemptions become well 
known, many DWI suspect will likely claim religious or medical exemptions—at 
least until the alcohol dissipates from their bloodstreams.  Another subset of 
individuals suffers from a deep fear of needles, trypanophobia, and may find the 
intervention psychologically traumatic.171  Hamilton reports that up to ten percent 
of Americans may suffer some degree of this disorder, and even reports cases of 
fatal reactions secondary to a vaso-vagal reflex after injection.172  Moreover, all 
blood draws pose at least some additional risk of infection.173  In a well publicized 
2007 case, thirty-one-year-old test pilot James Green of Arizona sued Pima County 
and its Sheriff’s Department after a forced blood draw allegedly left him with an 
infection for months that did not respond to antibiotics.174  Yet the very risks 
involved in forced blood draws might arguably justify physician involvement.  
Since some states now allow police to draw blood without medical personnel,175 
which might result in even greater risk,176 providers who refuse to participate—at 
least in those jurisdictions—do not ultimately change the outcome for suspects and 
may actually expose them to increased dangers.  Of course, such reasoning might 
be used to justify physician involvement in a broad swath of questionably ethical 
police activity, including enhanced interrogation methods.177 
Suspects transported to hospitals solely for the purposes of forced blood 
draws may not be patients in the traditional sense; and some advocates of forced 
blood draws might argue that they are not patients at all.178  Yet professional 
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organizations of health care providers have none-the-less consistently found that 
the absence of a traditional provider-patient relationship does not free a provider to 
become an agent of law enforcement without limitation.  For example, the 
American Medical Association and American Psychiatric Association have 
determined that participation in executions violates the ethical duties of 
physicians.179  A consensus is slowly emerging that the forcible medication of 
psychiatric patients to render them fit for capital punishments, while legal, is also 
impermissible.180  Although the stakes are clearly lower in forced blood draw cases 
than in capital trials, society also has many other options available to reduce 
intoxicated driving that do not entail commandeering health professionals.  These 
range from increasing the penalties for refusing to consent181 to requiring breath 
alcohol ignition locks in vehicles.182  Relying upon health workers may be easier 
and cheaper, as compared with training a separate body of professionals to engage 
in such blood draws, but that alone is not a satisfactory justification.183  
Unfortunately, the leading professional organizations have as yet not taken a firm 
stance on the practice or outlined guidelines for participation by their members.184  
Needless to say, such guidance is long overdue. 
Since the individual provider in the field will likely have little power to resist 
police demands for forced testing—and may even be uncertain as to the governing 
law—hospitals should clarify their positions on the practice in advance and should 
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notify all emergency providers.  Hospitals may even be able to negotiate with local 
authorities to establish guidelines for participation that meet the needs of law 
enforcement without damaging the perceived ethical duties of clinicians.  Earlier 
this year, for example, Memorial Hospital of Converse County, Wyoming, did 
precisely that: after initially refusing involvement with any forcible blood draws, 
citing ethical and liability concerns, the hospital worked out an arrangement with 
local police to conduct the involuntary tests off-site, under color of a judicial 
warrant, an approach that apparently satisfied their providers’ objections.185 
While individual providers will likely differ regarding whether and when 
participation in forcible blood draws is ethical, in the absence of clear guidance 
from professional organizations, three minimum standards seem necessary to 
justify any healthcare institution participating in such procedures.  First, forced 
blood draws should be completely sequestered from the practice of medical care.  
The medical providers designated to take part in the forced blood draw should play 
no other role in the care of the suspect, as the risk is too great that the blurring of 
roles will compromise the greater medical care of the patient.186  So, for example, if 
a patient is injured in a motor vehicle accident, the physicians and nurses attending 
to his injuries must not be the same individuals who draw blood for police.  Should 
care givers need to draw blood for therapeutic reasons, this blood ought not also be 
used for law enforcement purposes—and the patient should be advised which 
interventions are being conducted on his behalf and which are being conducted to 
serve the interests of the public.  Second, institutions should require assurances that 
involuntary blood samples are used solely for the determination of intoxication.  
While the police may have a legitimate reason for using blood samples for other 
law enforcement purposes—such as storing them for future DNA checks against 
crime scenes187—physicians ought not risk being complicit in such projects, 
particularly as these extraneous uses raise significant risks to a subject’s privacy.188  
Ideally, a sensible policy will require that all blood samples either be returned to 
the hospital after testing is completed, or that the hospital be provided with written 
confirmation of their destruction.  Finally, individual providers should be 
guaranteed the right to opt out of the intervention as long as they make a good faith 
effort to find another provider who can participate.  Such conscience clauses have 
 
 185. See Collin McRann, MHCC Reverses Its Policy on Involuntary DUI Blood Draws, 
DOUGLAS BUDGET (Wyoming) (Sept. 28, 2011), www.douglas-
budget.com/news/article_51f67596-e9ee-11e0-b3fb-0001cc4c03286.html.  
 186. See Wherry, supra note 155, at 667–80 (highlighting the ethical and legal dilemmas 
physicians face in conducting forcible blood draws on patients).  
 187. See George J. Annas, Privacy Rules for DNA Databanks: Protecting Coded “Future 
Diaries”, 270 JAMA 2346, 2347 (1993) (noting that law enforcement officials want to create 
DNA fingerprinting banks to identify perpetrators).  
 188. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 491 (Cal. 1990) 
(examining the argument that depriving a patient of the power to control what happens to their 
tissues would be an invasion of the patient’s privacy and dignity).  
  
154 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 17: 
for many years shielded physicians from participation in certain reproductive and 
end-of-life interventions they find objectionable189—even in circumstances where 
the result is that a patient’s medical needs go unmet.190  It would prove ironic if 
physicians could not opt out of interventions that have the potential to harm the 
patient on similar grounds of conscience.  Occasionally, such conscience objections 
may prevent any blood draw from taking place—if, for instance, no willing 
provider can be found—but, in the absence of any evidence that such occurrences 
will be widespread, the risk of a few missed blood draws seems less grave than the 
damage to be done by forcing reluctant providers to draw blood from patients under 
the threat of criminal sanction.191   
While using the public roads may entail consent to forcible blood testing,192 
joining the health care professions does not necessarily entail consent to perform 
such blood draws.193  The act of inflicting unwanted medical care on a competent 
adult—a violent intrusion that contrasts strikingly with the general norms of the 
healing trades—is likely to prove disturbing and objectionable to many 
professional caregivers.194  At a minimum, providers and their employers should 
educate themselves on their specific duties and should reach out to local law 
enforcement authorities to clarify in advance potential matters of disagreement.  
Advance planning may not entirely eliminate the possibility of conflict, but such a 
negotiated approach has at least the potential to mitigate friction between providers 
and public authorities.  After all, the ethical and legal issues surrounding forcible 
blood draws by physicians and hospital employees are far too important to be 
resolved ad hoc in emergency rooms as difficult cases arise. 
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